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Abstract The implementation of the AES encryption
core by Moradi et al. at Eurocrypt 2011 is one of the
smallest in terms of gate area. The circuit takes around
2400 gates and operates on an 8 bit datapath. How-
ever this is an encryption only core and unable to cater
to block cipher modes like CBC and ELmD that re-
quire access to both the AES encryption and decryption
modules. In this paper we look to investigate whether
the basic circuit of Moradi et al. can be tweaked to
provide dual functionality of encryption and decryp-
tion (ENC/DEC) while keeping the hardware overhead
as low as possible. We report two constructions of the
AES circuit. The first is an 8-bit serialized implementa-
tion that provides the functionality of both encryption
and decryption and occupies around 2605 GE with a la-
tency of 226 cycles. This is a substantial improvement
over the next smallest AES ENC/DEC circuit (Grain
of Sand) by Feldhofer et al. which takes around 3400
gates but has a latency of over 1000 cycles for both the
encryption and decryption cycles.
In the second part, we optimize the above architec-
ture to provide the dual encryption/decryption func-
tionality in only 2227 GE and latency of 246/326 cycles
for the encryption and decryption operations respec-
tively. We take advantage of clock gating techniques
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to achieve Shiftrow and Inverse Shiftrow operations in
3 cycles instead of 1. This helps us replace many of
the scan flip-flops in the design with ordinary flip-flops.
Furthermore we take advantage of the fact that the In-
verse Mixcolumn matrix in AES is the cube of the For-
ward Mixcolumn matrix. Thus by executing the For-
ward Mixcolumn operation three times over the state,
one can achieve the functionality of Inverse Mixcolumn.
This saves some more gate area as one is no longer re-
quired to have a combined implementation of the For-
ward and Inverse Mixcolumn circuit.
Keywords AES 128 · Serialized Implementation
1 Introduction
There has been extensive research into the construc-
tion of compact implementations of lightweight block ci-
phers. This line of research has essentially evolved along
two different lines. The first aims to construct propri-
etary lightweight block ciphers by optimizing one or
several parameters in the design spectrum, as has been
evidenced by numerous such designs proposed in the
past few years: HIGHT [21], KATAN [11], Klein [18],
LED [19], Noekeon [13], Present [7], Piccolo [27], Prince
[8], Simon/Speck [6] and TWINE [28]. The second aims
at attempting to implement standardized ciphers like
AES 128 [14] in a lightweight fashion.
There have been several lightweight implementa-
tions of AES proposed in literature. Some results like
[20] and [10] aim for compact implementations in ASIC
and FPGA platforms respectively (however the work
in [20] is for an encryption only core). The works in
[22] and [29] aim at lowering critical path and increas-
ing throughput. And the works in [3] and [5] aim to
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implement circuits with low energy consumption per
encryption operation.
For compact implementations of the dual encryp-
tion/decryption circuit, the following results are known.
In [26], the authors propose a 32-bit serial architec-
ture with optimized tower field implementation of the
S-box and a combinatorial optimization of the Mix-
column circuit. The size of this implementation was
around 5400 GE (gate equivalents, i.e. area occupied
by an equivalent number of 2-input NAND gates). The
“Grain of Sand” implementation [17] by Feldhofer et al.
constructs an 8-bit serialized architecture with circuit
size of around 3400 GE but a latency of over 1000 cycles
for both encryption and decryption. Very recently in
[23], the authors report an 8-bit serial implementation
that takes 1947/2090 GE for the encryption/decryption
circuits respectively. This implementation makes use of
intermediate register files that can be synthesized in the
ASIC flow using memory compilers.
The implementation by Moradi et al. in [25] with
size equal to 2400 GE and encryption latency of 226
cycles is one of the smallest known architectures for
AES. The design combines 8-bit and 32-bit serial dat-
apaths in a manner that achieves a surprisingly com-
pact implementation. The design uses scan flip-flops for
constructing the registers for the state update and key
schedule. A scan flip-flop occupies 1 GE less area than
the combination of an ordinary flip-flop and a 2:1 multi-
plexer, while offering the same functionality. Thus this
trick saves 1 GE per flip-flop used. This implementa-
tion also uses a 32 bit Mixcolumn circuit instead of the
8-bit serialized structure of [17], because the authors
argue that any savings in area achieved by an 8-bit se-
rial circuit is offset by the additional registers required
to store its output. Finally since each round function
in this circuit is implemented in 21 cycles, the control
system is made using a 21 cycle LFSR that generates
all timing signals accordingly. However this circuit is
an encryption-only core, and therefore cannot be used
to implement modes like CBC [16], COPA [2], ELmD
[15], POET [1] that require access to both AES encryp-
tion and decryption functionalities. Therefore area-wise
the three smallest known circuits that perform the dual
functionalities of both encryption and decryption are
A. Grain of Sand implementation [17] at 3400 GE
B. 8-bit serial implementation in [23] at 4037 GE
C. 32-bit serial implementation in [26] at 5400 GE.
Moreover the Grain of Sand implementation has a la-
tency of over 1000 cycles for both the encryption and
decryption operations and so for efficient lightweight
implementation of all modes that require access to both
AES encryption and decryption it is critical to have an
architecture that is both lightweight and incurs mini-
mal latency.
1.1 Contribution and Organization
In this paper we present two circuits. The first, Atomic-
AES, is an 8-bit serial architecture that performs the
dual functionality of encryption and decryption, and
has a circuit size of around 2605 GE when synthesized
with the standard cell library of the STM 90nm CMOS
logic process. The circuit has a latency of 226 cycles for
both encryption and decryption operations. The circuit
is closely related to the 8-bit encryption only serial ar-
chitecture presented in [25], and in fact the architecture
has the following additional logic components over the
basic circuit proposed by Moradi et al.
1. 2 additional 8-bit multiplexers added to the state
datapath,
2. 3 additional 8-bit xor gates in the key datapath,
3. 24 additional and gates in the key datapath,
4. 1 additional 8-bit multiplexer, 1 additional 8-bit xor
gate, 16 additional and gates during state-key addi-
tion,
5. Other additional logic required to implement
a. S-box and its inverse,
b. Mixcolumn and its inverse,
c. Round constants and their inverses.
Thereafter, we propose the Atomic-AES v2.0 archi-
tecture that at 2227 GE, occupies around 400 GE less
using the same standard cell library. The architecture
has encryption/decryption latency of 246/326 cycles.
Each encryption round is computed in 23 cycles, each
decryption round takes 31 cycles. The savings in area
comes from principally two avenues:
1. The Shiftrow/Inverse Shiftrow operations are per-
formed over three cycles rather than 1. This reduces
the number of 2 input flip-flops required in the de-
sign. So it helps the designer replace a lot of the
scan flip-flops in the design with ordinary flip-flops.
A scan flip-flop usually occupies 1 GE more than
an ordinary flip-flop. Hence this trick, on average,
saves 1 GE of area per bit of storage.
2. Additionally the Inverse Mixcolumn matrix used in
AES is the cube of the Forward Mixcolumn matrix.
This implies that executing the Mixcolumn opera-
tion 3 times over the state achieves the functionality
of Inverse Mixcolumn. Thus the designer no longer
needs a combined implementation of the Forward
and Inverse Mixcolumn Circuit.
The paper is organized in the following manner. Sec-
tion 2 gives some background and description of the ar-
chitecture presented in [25]. This would be beneficial for
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the self-sufficiency and better understanding of this pa-
per. Section 3, describes the architecture and function-
ing of Atomic-AES in details, and highlights some issues
related to its implementation. Section 4 describes the
architecture and functioning of Atomic-AES v2.0. Sec-
tion 5 tabulates all implementation results and com-
pares it with previous architectures present in litera-
ture. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Background and Preliminaries
In Figure 1, a pictorial description of the architecture in
[25] is given. As can be seen the basic elements of stor-
age are the 16 byte sized registers made of scan flip-flops
in the state and key path respectively, used to store the
intermediate states and roundkeys. Each round func-
tion is calculated in 21 cycles and so it is important
to understand how the data is maneuvered through the
registers during this period. An important point to note
is that this particular architecture interprets the AES
input vectors in a row major fashion i.e. the first four
bytes are placed in the first row, the second four bytes
in the second row so on. Most AES implementations
use a column major ordering. If column major ordering
is needed, 20 additional 8-bit multiplexers are required.
However since the reordering costs are marginal, we as-
sume that it is performed oﬄine by some processor or
microcontroller that communicates with the hardware
circuit.
Let us label the 21 cycles per round by the integers
0 to 20. The encryption process starts with the addi-
tion of the whitening key and the S-box computation
of the first round function. In order to do so the finite
state machine (FSM) generating the timing signals is
initialized to cycle number 5. So in cycles numbered 5
to 20 (i.e. the very first 16 cycles) the following trans-
formations take place:
Cycles 5 to 20: The 8 bit chunks of plaintext and key
are respectively filtered out of the main state and
key multiplexers respectively. They are xored, and
the resultant signal fed to the S-box. The output
of the S-box is fed to the bottom most multiplexer
in the state path (marked by SBIN ), from where
it is shifted serially forward in the next round. Ef-
fectively, after the cycle 20 is completed, the state
registers would store the value S(PT ⊕ K), where
S(·) denotes the bytewise application of the AES
S-box function. In the same period the 8 bit chunk
of the Key is input to key register marked “33”,
from where it is serially forwarded in the next round,
much like in the state register. Therefore, at the end
of cycle 20, the Key registers hold the value of the
initial whitening key.
After this the cycle counter is automatically reset to 0,
and each 21 cycle round function is executed 10 times,
thus accounting for a total latency of 16+21∗10 = 226.
During this period the order of operations is as follows:
Shiftrow → Mixcolumn → Add roundkey + S-box∗
where S-box∗ denotes the substitution layer of the sub-
sequent round function. To clarify, let us see the cycle-
wise description of the data movement:
Cycle 0: This cycle is used for the Shiftrow operation.
Since each 8-bit register in the state and key paths
are constructed using scan flip-flops, they have two
input data ports which they filter depending on a
select signal. As can be seen in Figure 1, the state
registers are connected to facilitate the Shiftrow op-
eration during cycle 0. The key register is “frozen”
in this cycle and so no data movement takes place.
1
Cycles 1 to 4: The Mixcolumn operation is performed
during these 4 cycles. The Mixcolumn circuit used
in this architecture is a {0, 1}32 → {0, 1}32 logic
block, and so data from leftmost column (registers
marked 00,10,20,30) of the state is fed as input to
the Mixcolumn circuit. In the subsequent cycle the
Mixcolumn output is driven into the rightmost col-
umn (registers marked 03,13,23,33). This operation
carried out over 4 cycles computes the Mixcolumn
over the entire state. Note that this operation is
bypassed in the 10th encryption round as the Mix-
column function is omitted in the final round.
During this period, the non-linear function of the
Keyschedule operation is computed in the Key reg-
isters. Recall that the non linear operation in the
AES Keyschedule is given as
F (K3) = S(K3≪ 8)⊕RCONi,
where K3 denotes the third column of the current
roundkey,≪ denotes the left rotate operation and
RCONi is the i
th round constant (note that the
round constant is added to the most significant byte
of S(K3≪ 8)). (K3≪ 8) is a 32 bit value and so
S(K3 ≪ 8) implies the S-box function applied to
each of the 4 bytes of the input. In order to imple-
ment the rotation operation, the data is taken from
the output of the key register marked “13” and fed
to the S-box. Although the architecture uses only
1 One way to achieve this is to use a gated clock which does not
present a leading edge during the shiftrow period.
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Fig. 1: The 8-bit serial architecture in [25]
one S-box, in cycles 1 to 4, the state path opera-
tions do not use the S-box circuit and so the key
path S-box operations can be done in this period.
The S-box output is xored to the output of the reg-
ister “00” and the round constant and, in the next
cycle is driven into the register marked “30”. Note
that since there is “vertical” movement of data in
the key registers in this period, at the end of cycle
4, the four columns of the key register store the val-
ues K0 ⊕ F (K3),K1,K2,K3 respectively, where Ki
denotes the ith column of the current roundkey.
Cycles 5 to 20: The bytes of state and roundkey are re-
spectively taken out of the registers marked “00” of
both the state and key paths and xored together
and fed to the S-box. The output of the S-box is
again driven into the bottom most state register
“33” and serially shifted forward in the subsequent
rounds. This sequence of operations is exactly same
as the ones performed in the very first 16 cycles,
with the only exception that an intermediate state
and roundkey chunks are xored instead of the raw
plaintext and key.
The operations in the Key register are a little more
interesting during this period. Note that in order to
perform roundkey addition during these cycles, the
data emanating from key register “00” needs to be
equal to the current roundkey. However we have seen
that at the end of cycle 4 the columns of the key reg-
isters hold the value K0 ⊕ F (K3),K1,K2,K3. Note
that if K0,K1,K2,K3 and L0, L1, L2, L3 denote the
4 columns of the current and next roundkey then
we have
L0 = K0 ⊕ F (K3), L1 = K1 ⊕ L0, L2 = K2 ⊕ L1,
L3 = K3 ⊕ L2.
Thus at the end of cycle 4, only the 0th column
holds the correct next roundkey L0. The problem
is solved by having an extra xor gate taking inputs
from the registers “00” and “01” and output feeding
into “00”. Since the movement of data is switched
to “horizontal”, this helps to perform on the fly ad-
dition as the key chunks are driven out of the “00”
register. The addition is however not executed at
cycles 8,12,16,20 by zeroing the SELXOR signal be-
cause as previously noted, the 0th column already
has the required roundkey. Also after the roundkey
addition, each 8-bit key is circularly shifted back
into the key registers through register “33” in or-
der to facilitate the operations in the next round
function.
The ith round in this architecture computes the
Substitution layer for the (i + 1)th AES encryption
round. This being so, in the tenth and final encryp-
tion round the only operations that need be performed
are Shiftrows and the final roundkey addition. Thus in
the tenth round, the Mixcolumn operation is bypassed
in cycles 1-4 and the output ciphertext is available just
after the roundkey addition from cycles 5 through 20.
3 Atomic-AES: Architecture and Dataflow
We will now present a full description of the proposed
architecture for Atomic-AES which provides dual func-
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tionalities for encryption and decryption. A diagram
for the proposed architecture is presented in Figure 2.
The architecture builds on the basic circuit in [25], and
so the functioning of the circuit during encryption is
exactly as described in Section 2.
3.1 Issues with the Decryption Circuit
In order to accommodate decryption operation in the
basic circuit of [25], there are some principal difficulties.
We will list them one by one:
1. Shiftrow/Inverse Shiftrow: In the Shiftrow op-
eration, the data in the ith row is left-rotated by i
bytes (0 ≤ i ≤ 3). Hence the Inverse Shiftrow opera-
tion would require the i-byte right-rotation of the ith
row data. However, in order to accommodate Inverse
Shiftrow, and Forward Shiftrow simultaneously we
would potentially require another multiplexer at the
input of each 8-bit state register.
2. Forward/Inverse Keyschedule: The Keysched-
ule used in AES has a non-linear shift register like
structure, and it is obvious that the key register
structure in [25] was explicitly constructed to ac-
commodate its unique mathematical structure, and
at the same time produce the current roundkey in an
8-bit serial fashion. It is not immediately clear how
the Inverse Keyschedule could be arranged in such
a circuit without increasing the circuit size signifi-
cantly. Also we must note that for decryption, the
inverse cipher key (i.e. the final round encryption
key) must be made available, because all roundkeys
in the decryption circuit are calculated in the re-
verse order.
3. Sequence of operations during Decryption:
The circuit in [25] requires 21 cycles to complete
a round function, with the order of operations be-
ing: Shiftrows, Mixcolumn followed by Add round-
key and the S-box layer of the following round. It
is however not clear what order of operations would
achieve the most efficient circuit for decryption. If
one chooses to have roughly the same order of oper-
ations i.e. Inverse Shiftrows, Inverse Mixcolumn fol-
lowed by Add roundkey and Inverse S-box, then as
per the specification of the Decryption function, we
would require the Inverse Mixcolumn of the round-
key as well (as described in [26]). This would most
likely require additional cycles to compute the In-
verse Mixcolumn of the roundkey and thus increase
the latency.
3.2 Inverse Shiftrow
An efficient Encryption/Decryption circuit would need
to address all the above issues judiciously. To begin with
let us address the issue of Shiftrow/Inverse Shiftrow.
We make the following observations before proceeding:
Observation 1: For the 0th and the 2nd rows of the AES
state, Shiftrow and Inverse Shiftrow bring about the
same transformation.
Observation 2: For the 1st and the 3rd rows of the AES
state, Shiftrow and Inverse Shiftrow bring about op-
posite transformations. Which is to say, that the
Shiftrow operation on the 1st row brings about the
same transformation as the Inverse Shiftrow on the
3rd row and vice versa.
A careful examination of the architecture in [25] re-
veals that each 8-bit register (constructed with scan
flip-flops) accepts two inputs (see Figure 1): one from
the register immediately to its right (the rightmost reg-
ister accepts its input from the leftmost register of the
row below it), this connection is to facilitate the serial
loading and unloading of the bytes in the state during
cycles 5 to 20. The other input facilitates the transfer
of data during they Shiftrow cycle. However, for the
first three registers of the 1st row (i.e. “10”,“11” and
“12”) the two inputs are actually the same. So in order
to accommodate the Inverse Shiftrow, the second input
connection of these three registers can be rewired (see
Figure 2) just like in the third row (since the Inverse
Shiftrow of the first and Forward Shiftrow of the third
row are actually identical transformations). For the last
register of this row i.e. “13”, an extra multiplexer with
input from “10” is required. And that solves the prob-
lem for the first row.
For the 3rd row, the situation is even more straight-
forward. One of the direct results of Observation 2 ,
is that the first input connection for the registers “30”,
“31” and “32” (used primarily for serial loading of data)
can be used for the dual purpose of performing In-
verse Shiftrow. This being the case there is no need for
rewiring the inputs. However just as in the 1st row, for
register “33”, an extra multiplexer with input from reg-
ister “30” is required. Also as per Observation 1 , no
change in wiring or logic is required in the 0th and 2nd
rows. In Table 2, we summarize the input connections
for the first and third row state registers during the var-
ious operation stages. For example during serial load-
ing/unloading, register ‘13’ accepts data coming from
register ‘20’, whereas it takes data from ‘10’/‘12’ during
Shiftrow/Inverse Shiftrow respectively. As seen in Fig-
ure 2, the register ‘33’ takes data from the DECOUT
pin during the serial loading phase (i.e. cycles 5 to 20).
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Fig. 2: The AES 8 bit Encryption/Decryption architecture for Atomic-AES
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# Register SL SR ISR # Register SL SR ISR
Row 1 Row 3
1 10 11 11 13 1 30 31 33 31
2 11 12 12 10 2 31 32 30 32
3 12 13 13 11 3 32 33 31 33
4 13 20 10 12 4 33 DECOUT 32 30
Table 1: Input connections to the 1st and 3rd row state registers during various stages of the operation. (SL: Serial
Loading, SR: Shiftrow, ISR: Inverse Shiftrow)
3.3 Inverse Keyschedule
To recall, if K0,K1,K2,K3 and L0, L1, L2, L3 denote
the 4 columns of the current and next roundkey then
we have
L0 = K0 ⊕ F (K3), L1 = K1 ⊕ L0, L2 = K2 ⊕ L1,
L3 = K3 ⊕ L2.
During decryption, the roundkeys are generated in re-
verse order and so in the context of decryption, L =
L0, L1, L2, L3 is essentially the current roundkey and
K = K0,K1,K2,K3 is the key to be generated in the
subsequent round. So we rewrite the above relation as
K3 = L2 ⊕ L3
K2 = L1 ⊕ L2
K1 = L0 ⊕ L1
K0 = F (K3)⊕ L0 = F (L2 ⊕ L3)⊕ L0
So in order to have an Encryption/Decryption circuit
we need an architecture around the key registers that
can both (a) generate L given K as input and (b) gen-
erate K given L as input. The basic architecture in [25]
all ready achieves (a) and so we need accommodate (b)
i.e. the roundkey generation mechanism during decryp-
tion. We offer the following solution. Place three 8-bit
xor gates in the 3rd row of Key registers in the following
way (refer to Figure 2).
1. For 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, the xor gate takes inputs from the key
registers “3i” and “3 (i + 1)” and feeds its output
into register “3i”.
2. The third xor gate takes inputs from the registers
“33” and the current roundkey byte and feeds its
output into register “33”.
3. For each of these xor gates, the input coming from
register “3i” is anded with a SELED signal. This is
done so that serial loading and unloading can be
done when required by simply zeroing the SELED
signal.
To understand how the Inverse Keyschedule works, let
us look at the flow of data in cycles 5 to 20. For the
purpose of simplification let L0i, L1i, L2i, L3i denote the
4 key bytes in the column Li, and similarly let K0i,K1i,
K2i,K3i denote the 4 key bytes in the column Ki. Note
that the signal SELED is made 1 only during cycles 8,
12, 16, 20 of the decryption phase. The flow of data has
been explained in Figure 3.
It can be seen that at cycle 8, the three rightmost
key registers in the bottommost row have the key bytes
L00, L01, L02. At this point SELED is set to 1. Thus
in the next cycle the bottommost key row would con-
tain the bytes L00, K01 = L00 ⊕ L01, K02 = L01 ⊕
L02, K03 = L02 ⊕ L03 respectively. Similar additions
occur at cycles 12, 16 and 20 and as a result at the be-
ginning of cycle 0 of the next round the four columns of
the key register would have the values L0,K1,K2,K3
respectively. Thereafter in cycles 1 to 4, F (K3) is com-
puted in the same manner as described in the encryp-
tion cycles and added to L0 in the first column. And as
a result at the beginning of cycle 5, the key columns
contain K0 = L0 ⊕ F (K3),K1,K2,K3 which is the
complete next roundkey. Since the complete roundkey
is already available, the SELXOR signal controlling the
xor gate in the topmost row is zeroed as the roundkeys
are serially driven out for the add roundkey operation.
Thus all the functionalities of Inverse Keyschedule are
completely accommodated using this architecture. Fur-
thermore the complete decryption roundkey is available
from cycles 5 through 20, which is incidentally the pe-
riod during which we perform the add roundkey oper-
ation.
3.4 Sequence of operations
Unlike ciphers like Midori [4], Prince [8] and Noekeon
[13], AES was probably not concieved as an efficiently
implementable involutive cipher. As a result, the se-
quence of operations during the encryption and decryp-
tion flow are quite different. The sequence of operation
during the encryption flow is as follows:
1. Add whitening key.
2. Rounds 1 to 9
A. Substitution layer, B. Shiftrows,
C. Mixcolumn, D. Add roundkey
3. Round 10
A. Substitution layer, B. Shiftrows,
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Fig. 3: Data flow in the Key registers during Decryption
C. Add roundkey
As previously mentioned, the 21 cycle encryption phase
is arranged as Shiftrow→Mixcolumn→ Add roundkey
+ Substitution layer of next round. The decryption flow
of operations must exactly be opposite of encryption.
Since the Shiftrows/Inverse Shiftrows can be commuted
with S-box/Inverse S-box operation respectively, we can
go with the following composition of one decryption
round (also used in the architecture in [26]):
Inv. Shiftrow → Inv. Mixcolumn → Add roundkey
+ Inv. S-box
This sequence is attractive in this particular architec-
ture because it has exactly the same order of operations
as in encryption, and so it does not need too many
changes in the underlying control system that produces
select signals for the various multiplexers in the circuit.
However as mentioned in [26], this sequence essentially
swaps the order of Add roundkey and Inverse Mixcol-
umn operations. Since Mixcolumn and hence also In-
verse Mixcolumn are linear functions, this requires the
Inverse Mixcolumn function to be operated on the cur-
rent roundkey before using it during the Add round-
key operation (since MC−1(X + K) = MC−1(X) +
MC−1(K)). There are two ways to achieve this: a)
use an additional circuit for Inverse Mixcolumns or b)
spend extra cycles to compute the Inverse Mixcolumn
of the current roundkey. Option a increases circuit size
and option b increases latency.
In this paper we propose an alternate sequence of
the decryption cycle that compromises on neither the
circuit size nor latency. We propose the following flow:
Inv. Mixcolumn → Inv. Shiftrow → Inv. S-box +
Add roundkey
Since this sequence of operations is essentially the mir-
ror inverse of the AES encryption round function, no
swapping of Add roundkey and Inverse Mixcolumn is
needed, and that obviates the need to calculate the In-
verse Mixcolumn of the roundkey. To better explain the
operations, let us present a cycle by cycle breakdown of
the 21 cycle decryption round function. The decryption
starts with the addition of the whitening key. The fi-
nite state machine (FSM) generating the round signals
is again initialized to cycle number 5. So in cycles num-
bered 5 to 20 (i.e. the very first 16 cycles) the following
transformations take place:
Cycles 5 to 20: The 8 bit chunks of ciphertext and key
are respectively filtered out of the main state and
key multiplexers respectively They are xored, and
the resultant signal fed to the state registers. Note
that in the corresponding encryption stage, we ad-
ditionally calculated the S-box of the first round.
Hence in order to accommodate both encryption
and decryption we need a multiplexer after the S-
box circuit as shown in Figure 2. The Key bytes are
input to key register “33”, from where it is serially
forwarded in the next round. However as mentioned
in the previous subsection, the SELED signal is set to
1 at rounds 8, 12, 16, 20 due to which at beginning of
the next phase, the Key four register columns hold
the value L0,K1,K2,K3 respectively.
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ENCRYPTION 0 1-4 5-20
0 1-4 5-20
5-20
DECRYPTION
0-3 4
Add Whitening Key + S-box of 1st round
Store Key serially
Add roundkey + S-box of next round
Compute roundkey + Store it serially
State
Key
State
Key
Round
0
1-10
Round
0
1-10
0
1-10
State
Key
Shiftrow
Frozen
Mixcolumn
Compute F (K3)
Store Key serially (with SELED=1 at 8,12,16,20)
Store Key serially (with SELED=1 at 8,12,16,20)
Add Whitening Key
Inverse S-box + Add roundkey
Frozen Compute F (K3)
Mixcolumn−1 Shiftrow−1
Fig. 4: Operation sequences in the Encryption/Decryption stages
After this the cycle counter is automatically reset to 0,
and each 21 cycle round function is executed 10 times.
Since the data flow in the key registers has already been
explained in the previous subsection, we concentrate on
the state register.
Cycles 0 to 3: These cycles perform the Inverse Mix-
column operation on the state columns, in exactly
the same way Forward Mixcolumn is executed in the
encryption stage in cycles 1 to 4. However only in
the very first round the Inverse Mixcolumn opera-
tion is bypassed, as required in AES decryption.
Cycle 4: This cycle is reserved for the Inverse Shiftrow
operation.
Cycles 5 to 20: The bytes of state are taken out from
register “00” and input into the combined Forward
and Inverse S-box circuit to compute the Inverse
S-box operation. The output of the S-box is then
xored with the current roundkey byte from the key
register “00” and circulated serially back into the
state registers via the register marked “33”. Note
that the order of S-box and Add roundkey in the
decryption phase is exactly the opposite as the en-
cryption phase. As a result we employ two 8-bit xor
gates, one before and one after the S-box circuit, for
key addition in the encryption and decryption stages
respectively. The xor gate inputs are controlled by
and gates as shown in Figure 2, in order to bypass
the addition operation as required.
In the tenth and final round, the decrypted plaintext is
made available from cycles 5 through 20 after the Add
roundkey operation. The above process is explained pic-
torially in Figure 4. We now describe some of the com-
ponents used in the circuit.
3.5 S-box
Over the years, there has been substantial research into
compact circuit implementations of the AES S-box [9,
12,24,26,30]. Almost all of them use the underlying
algebraic structure of the AES S-box, that essentially
combines an affine transformation with an inverse com-
putation over the AES finite field. However the archi-
tecture due to Canright [12] remains one of the smallest
in terms of circuit size for the combined Forward and
Inverse S-box, and thus this is the architecture we chose
for the combined S-box/Inverse S-box circuit.
3.6 Combined Forward and Inverse Mixcolumn Circuit
In [26], the authors use the following decomposition of
the Inverse Mixcolumn matrix to achieve an efficient
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implementation:
14 11 13 9
9 14 11 13
13 9 14 11
11 13 9 14
 =

2 3 1 1
1 2 3 1
1 1 2 3
3 1 1 2
+

8 8 8 8
8 8 8 8
8 8 8 8
8 8 8 8
+

4 0 4 0
0 4 0 4
4 0 4 0
0 4 0 4

The xxtime (i.e. multiplication by 4) operation in AES
finite field can be implemented in 5 xor gates as shown
( b6 ⊕ b7 is computed just once and the output is reused
to construct the 5th LSB)
xxtime(b7, b6, . . . , b0) 7→ (b5, b4, b3 ⊕ b7, b2 ⊕ b6 ⊕ b7 ,
b1 ⊕ b6, b0 ⊕ b7, b6 ⊕ b7 , b6)
Using this implementation of xxtime, the authors pro-
posed a construction of Inverse Mixcolumns using 193
xor gates and a 32 bit multiplexer. However a more
efficient implementation is due to Paulo Barreto [14,
Section 4.1.3], which factorizes the Inverse Mixcolumn
matrix as :
14 11 13 9
9 14 11 13
13 9 14 11
11 13 9 14
 =

2 3 1 1
1 2 3 1
1 1 2 3
3 1 1 2
 ·

5 0 4 0
0 5 0 4
4 0 5 0
0 4 0 5

To implement the above circuit, we simply premultiply
the input column by the Circulant(5,0,4,0) matrix as
follows:
y3 = xxtime(x3⊕x1)⊕x3, y2 = xxtime(x2⊕x0)⊕x2
y1 = xxtime(x3⊕x1)⊕x1, y0 = xxtime(x2⊕x0)⊕x0
where X = (x3, x2, x1, x0) and Y = (y3, y2, y1, y0) are
the input and output columns of the multiplication
block. The multiplication block takes exactly 58 xor
gates. Thereafter we choose either X for Mixcolumns or
Y for Inverse Mixcolumns, and input the resultant to
the AES Mixcolumn circuit, as shown in Figure 5. Since
the Mixcolumn circuit can be efficiently implemented in
108 gates, the combined circuit takes 108+58=166 xor
gates and a 32 bit multiplexer which is more efficient
than the construction in [26].
Multiply By
5 0 4 0
0 5 0 4
4 0 5 0
0 4 0 5

AES
Mixcolumn
ENC/DEC
MCIN MCOUT
Fig. 5: Combined Forward and Inverse Mixcolumn cir-
cuit
3.7 Round Constants and Control System
We use LUT based round constants. If r is the cur-
rent round number, then the encryption operation uses
LUT(r), while the decryption operation uses LUT(11−
r). The two signals can be input to an 8-bit multiplexer
so that one can be chosen over the other as required.
To further optimize, one can instead place a multiplexer
before the LUT and choose between the 4-bit constants
r and 11 − r, and use the resultant signal as input to
the LUT. Since this requires only a 4-bit multiplexer,
it saves us additional area equivalent to a 4-bit mul-
tiplexer. Furthermore, all control signals are generated
using a 21 cycle LFSR as described in [25].
4 Atomic-AES v2.0: Architecture and Dataflow
We will now present a full description of the proposed
architecture for Atomic-AES v2.0 which provides dual
functionalities for encryption and decryption. A dia-
gram for the proposed architecture is presented in Fig-
ure 6. The Atomic-AES v2.0 architecture has strong
structural similarities with the Atomic-AES described
in the previous section, and thus it would be more ex-
pedient to highlight the salient dissimilarities between
the two architectures before providing a complete de-
scription of the functionalities in the data and key path.
4.1 Main changes
There are two structural optimizations in the Atomic-
AES v2.0 architecture, due to which it was possible to
reduce the area. They are listed as follows:
1. Replacing scan flip-flops with ordinary flip-
flops: One of the reasons why scan flip-flops are
used for implementing both the state and key reg-
isters was that these storage units needed to sup-
port multiple modes of operation, in which each
byte sized register needs to accept data from mul-
tiple sources. The state registers need to support
serially loading and unloading data as well as the
Shiftrow and Inverse Shiftrow operations. The key
registers support 2 types of data movement: hori-
zontal and vertical. the horizontal is meant for serial
loading/unloading data, while the vertical is used to
efficiently compute the nonlinear function F used in
the Keyschedule.
To begin, let us start with the Keyschedule. The ver-
tical movement of data used to compute the F func-
tion is required only in the outermost columns of
the key registers, i.e. columns 0 and 3. It is actually
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Fig. 6: The AES 8 bit Encryption/Decryption architecture for Atomic-AES v2.0 (boxes in grey denote byte registers
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not required in the two middle columns 1 and 2. It
is therefore possible to implement the middle-most
columns with ordinary rather than scan flip-flops.
Of course this requires that the data movement in
the middle columns be frozen when the function F
is being calculated. This can be easily achieved us-
ing clock gating techniques.
In the state registers, we argue that scan flip-flops
are required to implement only the byte registers
“13”, “23” and “33”. These are the byte registers in
the final column of rows 1, 2, 3 respectively. Scan
flip-flops are not required for “03” because the ze-
roth row does not require data movement during
the Shiftrow or Inverse Shiftrow operations. For ei-
ther the Shiftrow or Inverse Shiftrow operations,
there is a maximum movement of three columns
to the left for any row. Indeed, except the zeroth
row which does not require data movement, any
row which has a movement of x columns towards
the left for Shiftrow would undergo a movement of
4−x columns towards the left for Inverse Shiftrows.
Thus if the designer is prepared to allow 3 clock
cycles for the Shiftrow/Inverse Shiftrow operation
then both operations can be achieved by single di-
rectional data movement towards the left. This is
precisely why, the remaining byte registers can be
implemented with ordinary flip-flops. However, the
designer has to take help of clock gating to freeze
data movement in certain rows during the row-wise
shifting operation. This has been tabulated in Ta-
ble 2. As we will see shortly, during the Encryption
flow, the Shiftrow is executed in cycles labelled 0,
1, 2 and during Decryption the Inverse Shiftrow op-
eration is executed in cycles 12, 13, 14. Figure 6,
gives a complete picture of the architecture. Reg-
isters implemented using scan flip-flops are labeled
in grey. Except for 3 registers in the state and 8
in the key, all can be implemented using ordinary
flip-flops. Since ordinary flip-flops occupy approxi-
mately 1 GE less than scan flip-flops, this saves us
around 25 × 8 = 200 GE. In addition, we do not
need to use 2 extra 8-bit multiplexers used in the
state registers in Atomic-AES. So the total savings
is around 230 GE minus some additional logic used
to implement the clock gating signals.
2. Replacing Combined Mixcolumn circuit with
Forward Mixcolumn: In the previous section we
were using a combined Mixcolumn/Inverse Mixcol-
umn circuit which took 166 xor gates and a 32 bit
multiplexer. Since the circuit operated on a column
every clock cycle, a total of 4 cycles were required
to compute the Mixcolumn over the entire state. In
this work, we take advantage of the fact that the
Inverse Mixcolumn matrix used in AES is the cube
of the Forward Mixcolumn matrix, i.e.

14 11 13 9
9 14 11 13
13 9 14 11
11 13 9 14
 =

2 3 1 1
1 2 3 1
1 1 2 3
3 1 1 2

3
This directly implies that if the designer runs the
Forward Mixcolumn operation 3 times over the state
i.e. for 3 × 4 = 12 cycles, he would functionally
achieve the Inverse Mixcolumn operation. This in
turn means that a Forward Mixcolumn circuit which
occupies 108 xor gates is sufficient for both pur-
poses. This saves us area equal to 58 xor gates and
one 32 bit multiplexer, which amounts to around
130 GE. Note that in most standard cell libraries,
this would ordinarily lead to a saving of over 200
GE, instead of just 130 GE. However, we need to re-
alize that the Combined Mixcolumn circuit as shown
in Figure 5 is only a simplistic representation of the
logic blocks involved in the circuit. In practice, when
the synthesizer optimizes the Combined Mixcolumn
circuit for area, it is constructed using a network of
and/xor gates which ends up taking area which is
usually less than the sum of the areas of the For-
ward Mixcolumn circuit, 58 xor gates and a 32 bit
multiplexer. Hence the area savings of the Forward
Mixcolumn circuit over the combined circuit is only
around 130 GE.
4.2 Encryption Flow
The encryption flow is almost the same as the one used
in Atomic-AES and which has been described in brief in
the previous section and it maintains exactly the same
order of operations. There are subtle differences how-
ever. Since Shiftrow is executed over 3 cycles rather
than 1, one encryption round is carried out over 23 cy-
cles rather than 21. The circuit uses a maximum length
5 bit LFSR to generate control signals, which has a
period of 31 cycles which we label as 0 to 30. In the
beginning the control system is initialized to cycle 15.
Cycles 15 to 30: As before, the initial S(PT ⊕K) op-
eration is performed and the result is stored serially
in the state registers and the key bytes are stored
serially in the key registers.
Thereafter the counter is reset to 0, and the 10 en-
cryption rounds are executed one after the other. Each
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Shiftrow Cycles Inverse Shiftrow Cycles
# Row 0 1 2 12 13 14
1 0 F F F F F F
2 1 F F O O O O
3 2 F O O F O O
4 3 O O O F F O
Table 2: Data flow in the rows of state registers during Shiftrow/Inverse Shiftrow. (F: Frozen, O: Operational)
ENCRYPTION
0-2 3-6 15-30
15-30
DECRYPTION
0-11 12-14
7-14
0-2 3-6 15-307-14
Round
Round
Key
Key
Key
State
State
State
Add Whitening Key + S-box of 1st round
Store Key serially
Add roundkey + S-box of next round
Compute roundkey + Store it serially
0
1-10
0
1-10
0
1-10
Shiftrow
Frozen
Mixcolumn
Compute F
Control System
jumps from 6
to 15 during
ENCRYPTION
Store Key serially (with SELED=1 at 18,22,26,30)
Store Key serially (with SELED=1 at 18,22,26,30)
Add Whitening Key
Inverse S-box + Add roundkey
Frozen Compute F Frozen
Mixcolumn−1 Shiftrow−1
Fig. 7: Operation sequences in the Encryption/Decryption stages
round consists of the following ordered sequence of op-
erations:
Cycles 0 to 2: The state registers execute Shiftrow, and
the Key registers are frozen.
Cycles 3 to 6: The state registers execute Mixcolumn,
and the outermost columns of the Key register com-
pute the function F as explained in the previous
section. During encryption, the control system tran-
sitions from cycle 6 to cycle 15, so that cycles 7 to
14 do not occur.
Cycles 15 to 30: Exactly as in the previous section, the
bytes are driven serially out of “00” from both the
state and key side, the Add roundkey and Substitu-
tion layer of the next round are performed and the
resultant signal, and the key bytes are driven seri-
ally back into the state/key registers respectively.
The encryption function thus takes 23× 10 + 16 = 246
cycles to complete.
4.3 Decryption Flow
The decryption flow is also almost the same as the one
used in Atomic-AES and exactly the same order of op-
erations is maintained. The main differences are that
Inverse Mixcolumn is executed over 12 cycles and In-
verse Shiftrow over 3 cycles. Thus one decryption round
takes 31 cycles to complete. As before, in the beginning
the control system is initialized to cycle 15.
Cycles 15 to 30: As before the initial whitening key ad-
dition i.e. CT ⊕K operation is performed and the
result is stored serially in the state registers and the
key bytes are stored serially in the key registers. As
explained in the previous section, the SELED signal
is set to 1 in cycles 18, 22, 26, 30 to enable efficient
backward generation of the roundkeys.
Thereafter the counter is reset to 0, and the 10 de-
cryption rounds are executed one after the other. Each
round consists of the following ordered sequence of op-
erations:
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Atomic-AES (2605 GE) Atomic-AES v2.0 (2227 GE)
Key Register - 734 GE
State Register - 732 GE
Mixcolumn - 323 GE
S-box - 253 GE
Mux/Xor/And - 455 GE
Control System - 108 GE
Key Register - 641 GE
State Register - 579 GE
Mixcolumn - 192 GE
S-box - 253 GE
Mux/Xor/And - 415 GE
Control System - 147 GE
28.2%
28.1% 12.4%
9.7%
17.5%
4.1%
28.8%
26%
8.6%
11.4%
18.6%
6.6%
Fig. 8: Area requirements of the individual components (using the STM 90nm logic process )
Cycles 0 to 14: Now, the state registers execute Inverse
Mixcolumn during 0 to 11, and then Inverse Shiftrow
during 12 to 14. The key registers are frozen during
0 to 2 and again from 7 to 14. In the 4 cycles in
between, (i.e. during 3 to 6) the non-linear function
F is computed exactly as explained in the previous
section.
Cycles 15 to 30: The bytes are driven serially out of
“00” from both the state and key side, the Inverse
S-box is applied on the state bytes after which the
add roundkey is performed and the resultant signal,
and the key bytes are driven serially back into the
state/key registers respectively. The SELED signal
is again set to 1 in cycles 18, 22, 26, 30 to enable
efficient backward generation of the next roundkey.
The decryption function thus takes 31× 10 + 16 = 326
cycles to complete. The flow has also been explained
diagrammatically in Fig 7.
4.4 Control System
All control signals are generated using a maximal length
31 cycle LFSR. Some additional logic is used to sense
the clock cycle 6 in the encryption cycle and transition
to cycle 15.
5 Performance Evaluation
In order to perform a fair performance evaluation, we
implemented the circuit using VHDL. Thereafter the
following design flow was adhered to for all the circuits:
a functional verification at the RTL level was first done
using Mentor Graphics Modelsim software. The designs
were synthesized using the standard cell library of the
following logic processes
1. STM 90 nm logic process(CORE90GPHVT v 2.1.a),
2. STM 65 nm logic process(CORE65LPLVT v 5.1),
3. UMC 90 nm low leakage logic process,
4. TSMC 90 nm logic process,
with the Synopsys Design Compiler, with the compiler
being specifically instructed to optimize the circuit for
area. A timing simulation was done on the synthesized
netlist to confirm the correctness of the design, by com-
paring the output of the timing simulation with known
test vectors. The switching activity of each gate of the
circuit was collected while running post-synthesis simu-
lation. The average power was obtained using Synopsys
Power Compiler, using the back annotated switching
activity. The results are tabulated in Table 3.
We outline some of the essential lightweight metrics
of known implementations of encryption/decryption ar-
chitectures of AES and compare it with the two archi-
tectures proposed here. Energy consumption was listed
rather than power as it is a measure of the total electri-
cal work done during one encryption/decryption. Since
the circuits in Table 3 are implemented using differ-
ent CMOS logic processes, there are most likely to be
wide variations in energy consumption and maximum
throughput. For example the throughput of [23] is quite
high as it is implemented using the standard cell li-
brary of the 22nm CMOS logic process which is faster
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# Architecture Type Library Area Latency Energy TPmax
(GE) (cycles) (nJ) (Mbps)
1 8-bit Serial [25] E UMC 180nm 2400 226 8.4 -
2 Grain of Sand [17] ED Philips 350nm 3400 1032/1165 46.4/52.4 9.9/8.8
3 8-bit Serial [23] ED 22nm 4037 336/216 3.9/2.5 432/671
4 32-bit Serial [26] ED 110nm 5400 54/54 - 311
5 Atomic-AES ED STM 90nm 2605 226/226 3.3 93.8
STM 65nm 2931 2.2 58.4
UMC 90nm 3413 3.2 82.2
TSMC 90nm 3007 2.5 67.0
6 Atomic-AES v2.0 ED STM 90nm 2227 246/326 3.2/4.3 88.4/66.7
STM 65nm 2678 1.9/2.5 54.4/41.1
UMC 90nm 2700 2.6/3.4 79.3/59.9
TSMC 90nm 2569 2.2/2.9 65.0/49.1
Table 3: Performance Comparison of Atomic-AES with previous architectures in literature (Figures separated by
‘/’ indicate corresponding figures for encryption/decryption, E: Encryption only, ED: ENC/DEC)
than the other logic processes listed in the table. The
throughput of [26] is also high as it is a 32-bit serial
circuit and thus has considerably lower latency.
In Figure 8, we present a componentwise breakdown
of the circuit sizes of the two architectures. We use clock
gating to generate the clock for the State/Key regis-
ters, since the data movement has to be frozen for a
few clock cycles. For the Atomic-AES architecture, apart
from the multiplexers included in the implementation
of the combined Forward and Inverse S-box, Mixcol-
umn and Round Constants, a quick glance at Figure 2,
tells us that we need
1. Six 8-bit multiplexers around the state register, one
32-bit multiplexer to bypass the Mixcolumn circuit,
one 8-bit multiplexer after the S-box, and two 8-bit
multiplexers to filter the raw key/plaintext (cipher-
text) and the roundkey/state byte respectively.
2. Apart from this six 8-bit xors around the key regis-
ters and two 8-bit xors during state-key addition.
3. One input of 7 out of the 8 xor gates is controlled
by an and gate.
This adds up to around 455 GE for the multiplexers,
xor, and gates in the circuit. The LSFR based control
system and the round constants take around 108 GE.
This leads to 2605 GE for the entire circuit.
For the Atomic-AES v2.0 architecture, the modifi-
cations introduced imply that we need the following
overhead (see Figure 6)
1. Two multiplexers less around the State registers,
because we use two extra cycles to perform For-
ward/Inverse Shiftrow.
2. Considerable savings in the implementation of the
state and key registers (due to 21 byte size scan
registers being replaced by ordinary flip-flops).
3. Savings due to Combined Mixcolumn circuit being
replaced by a Forward Mixcolumn circuit.
4. Slightly more logic to design the LFSR based control
system, Round Constants and timing signals.
This implies that we need 415 GE for the multiplexers,
xor, and gates in the circuit. The LSFR based control
system, the round constants and the logic for clock-
gating take around 147 GE. Adding up the componen-
twise area figures as shown in Figure 8, this leads to
2227 GE for the entire circuit.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we present two compact architectures for
AES: Atomic-AES and Atomic-AES v2.0 that perform
the dual function of encryption and decryption. The cir-
cuits can be synthesized using 2605 and 2227 GE area
respectively, using the standard cell library of the STM
90nm CMOS logic process. While Atomic-AES uses 226
cycles for both encryption and decryption, Atomic-AES
v2.0 has an encryption/decryption latency of 246/326
cycles respectively. This is a substantial improvement
over the Grain of sand implementation that has an area
of 3400 GE but a latency of over 1000 cycles for both
encryption and decryption.
References
1. F. Abed, S. Fluhrer, J. Foley, C. Forler, E. List, S.
Lucks, D. Mcgrew, J. Wenzel. The POET Family of
On-Line Authenticated Encryption Schemes. Submis-
sion to the CAESAR competition. Available at https:
//competitions.cr.yp.to/round1/poetv101.pdf.
2. E. Andreeva, A. Bogdanov, A. Luykx, B. Mennink,
E. Tischhauser, K. Yasuda. AES-COPA v.1. Submis-
sion to the Caesar Compedition. Available at http://
competitions.cr.yp.to/round1/aescopav1.pdf.
16 Subhadeep Banik et al.
3. S. Banik, A. Bogdanov, F. Regazzoni. Exploring Energy
Efficiency of Lightweight Block Ciphers. In SAC 2015,
LNCS, vol. 9566, pp. 178-194, 2015.
4. S. Banik, A. Bogdanov, T. Isobe, K. Shibutani, H. Hi-
watari, T. Akishita, F. Regazzoni. Midori: A Block Ci-
pher for Low Energy. In ASIACRYPT 2015, LNCS, vol.
9453, pp. 411-436, 2015.
5. S. Banik, A. Bogdanov, F. Regazzoni, T. Isobe, H. Hi-
watari, T. Akishita. Round gating for low energy block
ciphers. In IEEE Hardware Oriented Security and Trust
(HOST), pp. 55-60, 2016.
6. R. Beaulieu, D. Shors, J. Smith, S. Treatman-Clark,
B. Weeks, L. Wingers. The Simon and Speck Families
of Lightweight Block Ciphers. In IACR eprint archive.
Available at https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/404.pdf.
7. A. Bogdanov, L. Knudsen, G. Leander, C. Paar, A.
Poschmann, M. Robshaw, Y. Seurin, C. Vikkelsoe.
PRESENT: An Ultra-Lightweight Block Cipher. In
CHES 2007, LNCS, vol. 4727, pp. 450-466, 2007.
8. J. Borghoff, A. Canteaut, T. Gu¨neysu, E. B. Kavun, M.
Knezˇevic´, L. R. Knudsen, G. Leander, V. Nikov, C. Paar,
C. Rechberger, P. Rombouts, S. S. Thomsen, T. Yalc¸in.
PRINCE - A Low-Latency Block Cipher for Pervasive
Computing Applications - Extended Abstract. In Asi-
acrypt 2012, LNCS, vol. 7658, pages 208-225, 2012.
9. J. Boyar, P. Matthews, R. Peralta. Logic Minimization
Techniques with Applications to Cryptology. In J. Cryp-
tology, vol. 26, pp. 28–312, 2013.
10. P. Chodowiec, K. Gaj. Very Compact FPGA Implemen-
tation of the AES Algorithm. In CHES 2003, LNCS, vol.
2779, pp. 319-333, 2003.
11. C. De Cannie`re, O. Dunkelman, M. Knezˇevic´. KATAN
and KTANTAN - a family of small and efficient
hardware-oriented block ciphers. In CHES 2009, LNCS,
vol. 5747, pp. 272-288, 2009.
12. D. Canright. A very compact S-Box for AES. In CHES
2005, LNCS, vol. 3659, pp. 441-455, 2005.
13. J. Daemen, M. Peeters, G. V. Assche, V. Rijmen.
Nessie Proposal: NOEKEON. Available at http://gro.
noekeon.org/Noekeon-spec.pdf.
14. J. Daemen, V. Rijmen. The design of Rijndael: AES - the
Advanced Encryption Standard. Springer-Verlag, 2002.
15. N. Datta and M. Nandi. ELmD v1.0. Submission
to the Caesar compedition. Available at https://
competitions.cr.yp.to/round1/elmdv10.pdf.
16. M. Dworkin. Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes
of Operation. NIST Special Publication 800-38A. Avail-
able at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/
800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf.
17. M. Feldhofer, J. Wolkerstorfer, V. Rijmen. AES Imple-
mentation on a Grain of Sand. In IEEE Proceedings of
Information Security, vol. 152(1), pages 13-20, 2005.
18. Z. Gong, S. Nikova, Y.W. Law. KLEIN: a new family of
lightweight block ciphers. In RFIDSec 2011, LNCS, vol.
7055, pp. 1-18, 2011.
19. J. Guo, T. Peyrin, A. Poschmann, M. J. B. Robshaw. The
LED Block Cipher. In CHES 2011, LNCS, vol. 6917, pp.
326-341, 2011.
20. P. Ha¨ma¨la¨inen, T. Alho, M. Ha¨nnika¨inen, and T. D.
Ha¨ma¨la¨inen. Design and Implementation of Low-Area
and Low-Power AES Encryption Hardware Core. In
DSD, pages 577-583, 2006.
21. D. Hong, J. Sung, S. Hong, J. Lim, S. Lee, B. Ko, C. Lee,
D. Chang, J. Lee, K. Jeong, H. Kim, J. Kim, S. Chee.
HIGHT: A New Block Cipher Suitable for Low-Resource
Device. In CHES 2006, LNCS, vol. 4249, pp. 46-59, 2006.
22. A. Lutz, J. Treichler, F. Gu¨rkaynak, H. Kaeslin, G.
Basler, A. Erni, S. Reichmuth, P. Rommens, S. Oetiker,
W. Fichtner. 2Gbit/s hardware realizations of RIJN-
DAEL and SERPENT: A comparative analysis. In CHES
2002, LNCS, vol. 2523, pp. 144158, 2002.
23. S. Mathew, S. Satpathy, V. Suresh, M. Anders, H. Kaul,
A. Agarwal, S. Hsu, G. Chen, R.K. Krishnamurthy.
340 mV–1.1V, 289 Gbps/W, 2090-gate nanoAES hard-
ware accelerator with area-optimized encrypt/decrypt
GF(24)2 polynomials in 22 nm tri-gate CMOS. In IEEE
Journal of Solid-State Circuits, vol. 50, pp. 1048–1058,
2015.
24. N. Mentens, L. Batina, B. Preneel and I. Verbauwhede. A
Systematic Evaluation of Compact Hardware Implemen-
tations for the Rijndael S-Box. In CT-RSA 2005, LNCS,
vol. 3376, pp. 323–333, 2005.
25. A. Moradi, A. Poschmann, S. Ling, C. Paar, H. Wang.
Pushing the Limits: A Very Compact and a Threshold
Implementation of AES. In Eurocrypt 2011, LNCS, vol.
6632, pp. 69-88, 2011.
26. A. Satoh, S. Morioka, K. Takano, S. Munetoh. A Com-
pact Rijndael Hardware Architecture with S-Box Opti-
mization. In Asiacrypt 2001, LNCS, vol. 2248, pp. 239-
254, 2001.
27. K. Shibutani, T. Isobe, H. Hiwatari, A. Mitsuda, T. Ak-
ishita, T. Shirai. Piccolo: An Ultra-Lightweight Blockci-
pher. In CHES 2011, LNCS, vol. 6917, pp. 342-357, 2011.
28. T. Suzaki, K. Minematsu, S. Morioka, E. Kobayashi.
TWINE: A Lightweight Block Cipher for Multiple Plat-
forms. In SAC 2012, LNCS, vol. 7707, pp. 339-354, 2012.
29. R. Ueno, S. Morioka, N. Homma, T. Aoki. A High
Throughput/Gate AES Hardware Architecture by Com-
pressing Encryption and Decryption Datapaths - Toward
Efficient CBC-Mode Implementation. In CHES 2016,
LNCS, vol. 9813, pp. 538-558, 2016.
30. R. Ueno, N. Homma, Y. Sugawara, Y. Nogami, and T.
Aoki. Highly Efficient GF(28) Inversion Circuit Based on
Redundant GF Arithmetic and Its Application to AES
Design. In CHES 2015, LNCS, vol. 9293, pp. 63–80, 2015.
